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Abstract
Predicting Estimates at Complete (EAC) for Department of Defense (DoD) space
programs has proven to be a daunting task. Although the use of Earned Value
Management (EVM) formulations have been around for several decades, research has
validated the need to conduct specific investigations based on commodity type and
contract completion percentage. A recent Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA)
study improved space program EAC accuracy using a Budgeted Cost of Work Performed
(BCWP) model. This research was conducted based exclusively on program level Work
Breakdown Structure (WBS) data. The DoD requires contractors to report lower level
WBS data, and current guidance supports the notion that lower level data are useful for
program analysis. This study assesses the BCWP model using lower level WBS data. In
addition, the second phase of this research investigates whether or not knowledge
concerning lower level WBS activities can improve the analytical ability to predict EAC
cost growth. The results indicate that lower level WBS data does not improve space
program EAC accuracy in combination with the BCWP model. This research also finds
that space programs contain a great deal of variability at lower level WBS activities
making it difficult to draw comparisons across contracts.
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FORECASTING DOD MID-ACQUISITION SPACE PROGRAM FINAL COSTS
USING WBS LEVEL 2 AND 3 DATA

I. Introduction
General Issue
In today’s ever-changing fiscal climate, the one aspect that can be assured is that
Department of Defense (DoD) major acquisition programs will need to be procured at
cheaper costs and with more efficient methods. Cost estimating is one avenue of the
DoD that is becoming more important as funding limitations continue to rise. The ability
to predict final program cost estimates is an essential element in today’s planning for
tomorrow’s future. Space acquisition programs are no exception to this notion, as they
continue to experience “billions of dollars in cost increases, stretched schedules, and
increased technical risks” (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011).
Within the DoD, declining budgets and the propensity for underestimation have
an inverse relationship; that is, as budgets continue to decline, the propensity for
underestimating continues to grow. Programs that are traditionally funded at sufficient
levels will see even more scrutiny of their annual targets, and as a result, competition for
funding ensues. This idea of competing for funding incentivizes the notion of bringing
forth the lowest revised cost estimate, which may not necessarily be the most reasonable
one (GAO, 2006). Although several factors, in addition to this incentive, are typically the
cause of underestimating, poor cost estimating and prediction techniques continue to be a
recurring area of concern.
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Problem Statement
Earned value management (EVM) techniques for predicting final program costs
have been used for nearly half a century, yet space systems acquisition continues to
observe areas of extreme cost growth – nearly 230 percent in one recent GAO study
(GAO, 2013). The preeminent problem lies in the inability to accurately predict final
space program costs; this problem results in excessive cost growth and cost overruns. In
the realm of space acquisition programs, little research has been accomplished to
examine alternative methods to estimating final program costs (Rusnock, 2008).
Although the techniques for calculating final program costs have evolved over time, the
basic premise remains the same. This premise attempts to use current data to predict
future final costs. The calculated cost is known as the program’s Estimate at Complete
(EAC). The EAC value provides pertinent information that decision makers require to
make funding decisions for an acquisition program. In situations where the initial EAC
value is underestimated, a funding gap develops between what was budgeted for a
program and what the program currently requires. The magnitude of this gap is
imperative, as the “affordability of a single program can affect the affordability of the
entire portfolio of systems” (Keaton, 2013).
Reasonableness, within the DoD, is often described as the “price that a prudent
businessperson would pay for an item or service under competitive market conditions”
(Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2009). Reasonableness, specifically in terms of
cost estimating, can be perceived as how well an estimate takes into account all known
data at the time the estimate is prepared. The EAC is used to forecast final program costs
using the latest available performance data; however, an EAC’s reasonableness might be
2

valid for only a finite period of time. As highlighted in one 2006 GAO study, it is
possible for space programs to continue for up to four years without an update to the
program’s final cost estimates. In that timeframe, a program may see numerous changes
that have substantial impacts on cost. Some of these changes include “changes in
planned quantities, funding instability, design changes, quality variances resulting from
rework, manufacturing or engineering changes, changes in supply chain and logistics
management and support, [and] technology-related problems” (GAO, 2006). As a result
of this reasonableness paradigm, Air Force policy requires major defense acquisition
programs to update their cost estimates at least annually (AFI65-508, 2012).
Due to the importance of developing accurate EAC figures, cost analysts at the
Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) conducted a study to improve the accuracy of
EACs for space programs that are midway through their acquisition lifecycles. The
results of the study demonstrated that EACs could be improved by approximately 15%
over the span representing the 20%-70% completion levels (Keaton, 2013). This
accuracy improvement is measured in comparison to the status quo EVM “Gold Card”
approach. Due to time and resource constraints, research was not conducted beyond the
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) program level, and AFCAA determined that further
research would be needed to determine the full extent of how much EACs could be
improved (Keaton, 2013). The analysis of lower level WBS data is accomplished
through this research.
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Research and Investigative Questions
The investigative questions aim to assist in answering the research question: can
lower level WBS data improve the overall accuracy of EVM based prediction models for
mid-acquisition space programs? Analysis and investigation is conducted utilizing both
levels two and three WBS space program data. The following investigative questions
serve as the basis of this examination:
•

What is the predictive capability of WBS level two data on mid-acquisition space
program EACs?

•

What is the predictive capability of WBS level three data on mid-acquisition
space program EACs?

•

Are there alternative predictors of cost estimates and growth that can be found
through analysis of WBS two and three data?

In answering these investigative questions, this research provides a detailed analysis of
the effectiveness of lower level WBS data on forecasting final cost estimates.
Methodology
The methodological approach aims to explore the significance of using WBS
level two and three data to predict actual program costs. WBS level two and three data
are summed and used to develop EACs using several calculation methods. These
calculated EACs are then compared to programs’ level one actual costs to examine the
accuracy of the measures.
The investigation is comprised of two separate phases of research. The first phase
aims to provide a direct comparison to the AFCAA study. This phase analyzes lower
level WBS data, while using similar techniques used in the AFCAA study. The second
4

phase of the investigation aims to explore whether or not commonalities exists at lower
levels that may be indicative of EAC fluctuations.
Research Contribution
The predominant focus of this research is to determine the accuracy of using
lower level WBS elements to predict mid-acquisition space program final cost estimates.
The results of this research provide AFCAA and other DoD entities primary and crosscheck analytical tools to project costs of space systems at several completion percentages
in their acquisition lifecycles. Results of the study may not be generalizable to all
defense acquisition program types; however, the results may provide key information and
data to the space acquisition community.
Chapter Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the current fiscal environment within the
DoD, the importance of EVM and EAC calculations, and specific research questions to
be addressed in subsequent chapters. The next chapter discusses the relevant literature
surrounding EVM principles and how EVM has evolved into the current form. Chapter
III describes the data used, the sources for the data, and the methodologies behind our
approach. Chapter IV presents the results of our analysis and our research findings.
Lastly, Chapter V presents our conclusions, discusses significant findings and
implications, and recommends areas for future research.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to explain pertinent background information and
review previous literature concerning Earned Value Management (EVM) and cost
growth. This chapter first explains concepts and terminology used throughout this
research. Following this explanation, an overview of previous research efforts is
provided. This overview highlights the history of predicting cost growth, an investigation
into various Estimate at Complete (EAC) formulation methods, and lower level EVM
data analysis.
Concepts
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)
The WBS is defined as a product-oriented structural framework composed of
hardware, software, services, data, and facilities. It acts as the blueprint, or outline, for
the complete end product and the product’s tasks. The WBS begins with top, or program,
level data and segments the program into lower level sub-components. At each
subsequent level of the WBS, the elements are more defined. Figure 1 displays an
example of items seen in the top three levels of a DoD space program. To the extent
possible, the levels of the WBS should be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.
This concept necessitates that WBS elements do not overlap and that they capture all
deliverables for the entire program. The DoD mandates any program or contract to
include the top three levels for reporting purposes; however, complex programs may
require greater levels of detail (MIL-STD-881C, 2011). Figure 2 displays the typical
6

numbered-naming convention used to define each WBS level. The WBS is essential in
defining the necessary tasks and building the framework for EVM.

Figure 1. DoD Space Program WBS Example

Figure 2. MIL-STD-881C Space WBS
7

Earned Value Management
In general terms, EVM is a quantitative project management technique for
assessing the performance and progress of a program. One researcher, Joseph Lukas,
defined EVM as a methodology for controlling a project, while relying on the WBS work
performance and an integrated schedule and budget (Lukas, 2008). Lukas frames his
argument on the concept of differentiating among earned value analysis, EVM, and an
earned value management system. For the purpose of this research, EVM is used as an
all-encompassing term to describe the overall subject matter.
EVM data are the product of various formulas and calculations linked to three key
cost elements: Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP), Budgeted Cost of Work
Scheduled (BCWS), and Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP). The BCWP
represents the “value of the work actually completed”; the BCWS represents the “portion
of the approved cost estimate planned to be spent on the project activity in a given time
period”; and the ACWP represents the “total of costs incurred in accomplishing work on
the activity” (Godbole, 2004). These three elements function as the basic foundation for
EVM; remaining EVM measurements are computed using a combination of these three
elements. A detailed description of common EVM terms and their calculations is found
in Table 1, which is a reproduction of information found in the Defense Acquisition
Guidebook (DAU, 2013).

8

Table 1. EVM Terms
EVM Term
BCWP
BCWS
ACWP

Meaning

Formula

"Earned value"; how much budgeted cost the
Sum of the budgeted cost of all completed
program has gained
work packages
"Planned value"; how much budgeted value the
Sum of the budgeted cost of all work
program should have gained
packages scheduled
"Actual cost"; how much cost has been incurred Sum of actual costs of all completed work
for the completed work packages
packages

Cost Variance (CV)

Difference between planned and actual cost to date

BCWP - ACWP

Schedule Variance (SV)

Difference (expressed in dollars) between planned
and actual schedule to date

BCWP - BCWS

Cost efficiency of the program

BCWP / ACWP

Schedule efficiency of the program

BCWP / BCWS

Planned total cost of the program

Sum of all BCWS of program

Cost Performance Index
(CPI)
Schedule Performance
Index (SPI)
Budget at Complete
(BAC)
Budgeted Cost of Work
Remaining (BCWR)
EAC

Budgeted cost of uncompleted work packages to
reach program’s completion
Forecasted/estimated total cost of program

To Complete Performance Projected CPI for the remainder of the project to
Index (TCPI)
meet the BAC

BAC – BCWP
Various formulas
Various formulas

Variance at Complete
(VAC)

Estimated cost variance at completion of program

BAC – EAC

Percent Complete

Percentage of the entire program that is complete

BCWPcum / BAC

Total of all contract’s work budgets

Sum of all budgets

Total budget allotted to the contractor

Sum of the negotiated contract cost and
authorized undefined work

Amount of the budget allotted for unknown costs
or risk management

Determined at start of contract

Total Allocated Budget
(TAB)
Contract Base Budget
(CBB)
Management Reserve
(MR)

Over the course of the past 50 years, the analysis of EVM data has proven to be
an adequate technique for controlling cost, schedule, and performance for government
contracts (Defense Contract Management Agency [DCMA], 2006). One area of
controlling costs, involves predicting program EACs. Although it is not explicitly stated,
Table 1 implicitly denotes that EACs can be calculated using various methodologies and
techniques. The primary source for obtaining program specific EVM data from
contractors is the contractor performance report (CPR). The CPR serves as the unbiased
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reporting method for delivering program status updates to the government and program
analysts.
Contractor Performance Report
The CPR is a management document that provides summary-level EVM data to
DoD system managers. Managers are then able to compare cost and schedule
performance data with technical performance measures, identify both actual and potential
problem areas, and provide valid, timely program updates to senior leaders. CPRs come
in seven different formats, as seen in Table 2 (OUSD: AT&L, 2005). This research
Table 2. CPR Formats
Title

Requirement

Description
Provides data to measure cost and schedule
performance by product-oriented WBS
elements

Format 1 - WBS

Mandatory

Format 2 Organizational
Categories

Optional

Provides the same data as Format 1, but by the
contractor's organization

Format 3 - Baseline

Optional

Provides the budget baseline plan against
which performance is measured

Format 4 - Staffing

Optional

Provides staffing forecasts for correlation with
the budget plan and cost estimates

Format 5 - Problem
Areas

Mandatory

Provides narrative information used to explain
significant cost and schedule variances and
other identified contract problems and topics

Format 6 - Integrated
Master Schedule

Optional

Provides details as to how and when the
integrated master plan (IMP) is accomplished

Format 7 - Electronic
History and Forecast File

Mandatory

Provides time phased cost data to include both
historical and forecasted information

focuses on Format 1, the WBS approach. An example of the Format 1 CPR can be seen
in Appendix A. The WBS CPR is required at least monthly, but can be required more
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frequently in certain circumstances. This CPR provides the necessary data to conduct
earned value analyses at each of the first three levels of the WBS. Research shows that
these analyses are vital in continually improving EAC estimation and the identification of
overall program growth (Rosado, 2011).
Relevant Research
In the research study, “Predicting Cost and Schedule Growth for Military and
Civil Space Systems,” Rusnock attempts to develop a set of models that can be used to
predict space system cost and schedule growth. Rusnock separately analyzes both DoD
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) space programs to
determine which characteristics provide the best indication as to whether or not, and to
what extent, cost and schedule growth will occur. Rusnock finds that communications
missions, ground equipment, firm-fixed price contracts, and increased program manager
tenure are all found to be predictive of lower cost growth for DoD space programs.
Rusnock provides various cost growth regression equations and possible explanations for
the existence of the relationships (Rusnock, 2008). Rusnock’s research effort provides
models and characteristics of programs that pose a risk for cost growth; however, with
this information alone, analysts can not make strategic decisions to mitigate these risks.
For example, analysts do not generally have control over the commodity type, contract
type, or length of PM tenure; therefore, analysts would be able to use Rusnock’s findings
only to assess whether or not their program contains attributes that are consistent with
lower or higher levels of cost growth. Although useful, Rusnock’s research does not
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provide analysts with tools that they can utilize to convey final EACs to upper
management.
EAC formulas and calculation approaches are abundant within the acquisitions
community. It is often difficult for PMs and analysts to determine which methods are
appropriate for their particular program. In a 1995 review by Christensen et al., this
difficulty level was further reinforced. The paper reviews 25 studies on EAC formulas
and models to determine which method is the most accurate. The results indicate that the
accuracy levels of the various approaches are dependent upon several factors; therefore,
no one method was deemed to be the most accurate in all settings. Index-based formulas’
accuracy was shown to be dependent on both the system type and the contract completion
stage (Christensen et al., 1995). These results enforce the need for independent research
that compares various EAC calculation methods across specific system types at different
completion percentages. As noted in the preceding AFCAA research study, current space
system cost estimation techniques using EVM methods are particularly sparse (Keaton,
2013).
The research study by AFCAA analysts focuses on predicting EACs for space
programs using program level data; however, the author also suggests that subsequent
level data could provide useful analysis as well (Keaton, 2013). The DCMA EVM
System guidance supports this suggestion when it states that detailed analysis on
contractor EACs should be performed at the lowest WBS level available (DCMA, 2012).
In 2011, Rosado conducted the first documented research study aimed at determining the
predictive capability of lower level EVM data using regression based techniques. The
study focuses solely on Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
12

contracts. Rosado discovers that there are little to no WBS lower level commanlities
between contracts; this holds true even within the same service, commodity type, and
contractor. With the one commonality he is able to find, level three Development Test
and Evaluation, the data prove to be significant drivers for program EAC growth;
however, these findings are not generalizable to all DoD acquisition contracts. Rosado
also notes that the results are not dependent upon service, contractor, or acquisition
category. Lastly, Rosado expresses that future research should provide analysis based on
specific program characteristics such as commodity type. (Rosado, 2011).
Although the accuracy of calculated EACs can vary greatly, it is important to
recognize the propensity for PMs and contractors to select the most optimistic estimates
to bring forward. Christensen articulates this tendency in his article “Project Advocacy
and the Estimate at Completion Problem.” Christensen uses the A-12 program to
demonstrate how optimism, by both contractors and government project managers (PM),
can be dangerous, which ultimately led to the A-12 program’s cancellation. Christensen
believes that contractors and PMs knowingly provide optimistic EAC figures in an effort
to prolong programs by securing funding. The results of Christensen’s research effort
show that the cumulative Cost Performance Index (CPI), which had been commonly used
as a ceiling in numerous estimates, was in fact a floor to the average final costs. The
research also showed that there was a significant correlation between the reported EACs
and the estimates calculated using cumulative CPI. Other common index-based estimates
were proven to be more accurate; however, they were less correlated to the reported
EACs. These results suggested that although more accurate methods existed, PMs and
contractors knowingly chose the lowest estimate as a basis for their reported figures
13

(Christensen, 1996). This inclination to report the estimate that presents the most
favorable outcome represents an inherent limitation to any EAC prediction model
research study. One theory suggests that “perhaps the future of this discipline [cost
estimation] will focus on methods of controlling program cost, rather than the futile
attempt to predict it” (Keller et al., 2014).
This theory on controlling program costs is the concluding thought of a recent
study by Keller et al., “What is Wrong with Space System Cost Models? A Survey and
Assessment of Cost Estimating Approaches,” which initially aimed to gather a deeper
understanding of the causes cost growth in space programs. Keller et al. find that current
methods and approaches to cost estimating space programs are inadequate due to their
inability to predict the future, lack of insight, and the idea of processes replacing good
judgment in decision making. The authors first state that parametric models lack the
ability to extrapolate beyond the programs of the past which they are founded upon. Next
the authors state that prediction models and techniques do not possess the ability to
accurately define cause and effect relationships in cost growth. Without this ability, it
becomes rather difficult to improve upon final cost estimation modeling. Lastly, the
article explains that analysts are too overwhelmed by the possibility of program failure.
This fear drives analysts to accept the mindset that insight and accuracy are “less
important than providing a number that will be approved by senior management and the
Office of Management and Budget” (Keller et al., 2014).
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Summary
In summary, there is a long history of cost growth models and EAC formulation
practices. In order to provide maximum value, new research must be founded on
information that is readily available to program analysts, and the findings should be
quantitative in nature so that analysts can provide useful information to their leadership.
Through his research, Christensen established the need to conduct EAC analysis on
specific system types and at various completion percentages. Lower level EVM data has
shown to be rather inconsistent when making comparisons of various system types and
across services; however, deeper analyses can uncover elements that may be indicative of
program cost growth. Taking all this into consideration, the inclination to report the
estimate that presents the most favorable outcome represents an inherent limitation to any
EAC research study. This mentality has even led some to believe that we should stop
trying to predict space program costs altogether. The next chapter discusses the data
sample and methodological approaches taken to address the issue of developing better
space program estimates.
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III. Data Collection and Methodology
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information on the data
collection and research methodology for the analyses in this thesis. This chapter first
provides a detailed explanation of the sample data collected. It then explains the
methodological approach taken and formulas used to conduct data analysis. The primary
tools utilized for this research are Microsoft Excel and the Defense Cost and Resource
Center (DCARC) CPR Viewer.
Data Source
The dataset used in this research is comprised of program data drawn from the
DCARC EVM central repository. DCARC was established in 1998 and is the largest
source of DoD cost data available to the cost community. DCARC’s primary mission is
to “collect current and historical Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) and Major
Automated Information System (MAIS) cost and software resource data in a joint service
environment” (DCARC, 2007). These program data were assembled from monthly
CPRs, contract history files, data reports, Integrated Program Management Reports, and
other miscellaneous submissions generated from program offices and contractors.
Due to the necessity of having data at WBS levels two and three, many of the
EVM data had to be manually transcribed into Excel; however, the primary method of
gathering level two and three data consisted of downloading the latest history file and
opening the file using the DCARC CPR File Viewer. The “export to Excel” function was
utilized to put the data in a useable, easily modifiable format. The selected data are
16

broken into two distinct samples. The smaller sample, dataset one, consists of the six
space acquisition contracts used in the previous AFCAA study (Keaton, 2013). The
larger sample, dataset two, contains all space program contracts found within the
DCARC repository.
Dataset one is linked to the preceding research study in which Keaton selected
programs that were representative of the field and contained sufficient data to conduct
their research. Space acquisitions, as a whole, is a vast field of study, and there are many
different focuses within its realm; some of the more common areas include space
vehicles, ground systems, satellites, ground control centers, and shuttles. For this reason,
the previous research study sample was used to focus the study on areas deemed most
important to field experts. Furthermore, one of the main goals of this research is to
determine the predictive capability of level two and three data. Taking this concept into
account, the use of the six contracts used in the AFCAA study would allow for a
conclusive assessment of the predictability of level two and three data in comparison to
the AFCAA study which used level 1 data. Table 3 displays the contracts that are
considered for dataset one.
Table 3. Dataset One Contracts
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Unfortunately, one of the six contracts, Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS),
could not be assessed at the level two and three WBS levels due to inaccessibility of the
data. Attempts were made to acquire the data from AFCAA, but the data were not
available in a useable format. In addition to the inaccessibility of the SBIRS data, the
program exhibited traits that would have made it difficult to assess. Most notably, the
contract completion percentages experienced a “roller-coaster” effect when graphed due
to the number of Over Target Baselines (OTB). This is clearly seen in Figure 3.

SBIRS - Effect of OTBs
Percent Complete
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40%
20%
0%
0
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100
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150
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Figure 3. SBIRS OTB Effects
Dataset two initially encompasses all space program contracts found within
DCARC. This initial assessment results in 41 total space contracts. 9 contracts are
removed due to their absence of CPR data within DCARC. 15 contracts are removed due
to not being at least 85% complete in terms of BCWP and BAC. An 85% completion
limitation is placed on the data set in order to ensure that the contract is somewhat
nearing completion. Although previous research suggests that the 92.5% completion
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point is a better representation of a contract’s final costs (Tracy and White, 2011), the
85% point is used in order to include as many contracts as possible. Imposing this lower
rate limitation, results in three additional contracts being retained in the dataset; two of
which were used in the preceding AFCAA study. Lastly, 8 contracts are removed due
containing missing, insufficient, or inaccurate data at WBS levels two and three. Of the
41 total space contracts, only 9 contracts meet the final specifications for this research.
Table 4 illustrates this gradual decline in the number of contracts used in dataset two.
Table 4. Dataset Two Contracts

The five programs marked with an asterisk are utilized in both finalized datasets.
The final 9 contracts in dataset two stem from 8 of the total 14 different space programs
in DCARC. This is significant since a large percentage of contracts did not meet the final
criteria, yet over half of all the space programs in DCARC are still represented in this
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study. The contract start dates for both datasets span over a period of approximately 14
years. The quantity by time period is captured in Table 5.
Table 5. Number of Contracts by Contract Start Date
Contract Start Date
1 Jan 2000-31 Dec 2004
1 Jan 2005-31 Dec 2009
1 Jan 2010-31 Dec 2013
Total

Number of
Contracts
3
4
2
9

Descriptive statistics regarding the various amounts of contract completion
percentages are found in Table 6. Although the 85% completion point was used as the
cutoff, the mean final reported EAC point was 96% for the 9 contracts. The completion
percentages for each contract can be seen by contract in Figure 4. These completion
percentages are representative of the available level one data. On occasion, subsequent
level data is not available at this same completion level; however, this results in a
difference of only a few percentage points. For example, the AEHF contract has level
one data available up until the 99% completion point; however, the level two and three
data is available up until only the 95% completion point. This difference is caused by a
lag in history file reporting within DCARC.
Additionally, there are two contracts that contain data issues worth noting.
Although most of the data used in this research is taken from the primary source,
DCARC, one contract necessitated the use of a secondary source. The FAB-T contract
began in September 2002, yet the data available in DCARC does not begin until October
2006. Hence, the data for this contract was supplied by AFCAA. Secondly, the
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NAVSTAR contract encounters a unique occurrence late into its duration. At the 92%
completion point, the nomenclature of the level two and three WBS activities drastically
changes beyond the point of reconciliation. Many of the previous WBS activities begin
with a new EAC figure of zero and remain there for several reporting periods. For these
reasons, the portion of analysis using lower level data covers the period up until this
point.
Table 6. Contract Coverage Statistics
Minimum EAC Coverage
Maximum EAC Coverage
Median EAC Coverage
Mean EAC Coverage
Standard Deviation

87%
100%
99%
96%
5%

Contract % Complete
100%
96%
92%
88%
84%
80%

Figure 4. Contract Completion Percentages

21

Methodology
The methodological approach taken for this thesis consists of two phases. The
first phase makes use of dataset one and is primarily influenced by the preceding study.
The goal of this approach is to recreate similar procedures to those used in the AFCAA
study in an effort to make a direct comparison to the results derived from utilizing lower
level EVM data. By conducting the analysis in this manner, variations in the results of
the two studies can be directly attributed to the use of level two and three data. This is
important so that disparities are not credited to differences in the procedural or technical
approaches. The second phase of the methodology aims to explore the extent of
underlining relationships found within lower level EVM data. Phase two provides
detailed analysis that searches beyond the EVM summary level two and three totals. In
this phase, the research involves looking into EAC cost drivers, finding commonalities
between programs and contracts, and seeing how changes in those drivers affect the EAC
estimates.
Phase One
Phase one of the methodological approach consists of steps that are comparable to
those used in the preceding study. First, WBS level one, two, and three EVM data are
gathered for each contract and placed in an Excel worksheet. These data consist of the
contract start date, estimated completion date, BAC, EAC, BCWS, BCWP, and the
ACWP. Next, the completion points are determined for each contract. Completion
points, in 10% increments, are identified from the 20% point to the 70% contract
completion point. Following this identification process, the cumulative Cost
Performance Index (CPI) and Schedule Performance Index (SPI) performance measures
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are calculated for each contract at every monthly reporting period. In formulating these
measures, a performance baseline EAC can be established. This baseline is considered as
the standard, or traditional, approach with which most members of the cost community
are familiar (Keaton, 2013). The formula for this baseline is found on the Defense
Acquisition University (DAU) EVM “Gold Card” and is known as the EAC Composite:

𝐸𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 =

𝐵𝐴𝐶
𝐵𝐴𝐶
=
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐶𝑢𝑚 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝐶𝑢𝑚
𝑆𝐶𝐼

(1)

The use of the EAC Composite as the baseline is a critical aspect of this research.
It is often thought that this EAC represents the cost ceiling in most programs which are
traditionally over cost and behind schedule. As stated in the Defense Management
Contractor Agency (DCMA) EVM System Program Analysis Pamphlet, “the EAC
Composite formula provides an upper bound, or the most pessimistic IEAC [Independent
EAC]” (DCMA, 2012). Hence, if a program is severely over budget and exceeds
estimated initial costs, the EAC Composite should represent the most accurate figure, in
terms of proximity, of the traditional EVM based estimates.
The next segment of phase one consists of calculating EACs using the BCWP
model. The BCWP model utilizes the relationship between remaining contract months,
the BCWP burn rate, and BCWP to date to estimate final costs. Final cost predictions for
contracts are made from the 20% - 70% incremental completion points. This approach
may vary from other EVM approaches because it “focuses exclusively on the rate at
which work is accomplished rather than cost efficiency” (Keaton, 2013). In other words,
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this approach assumes linearity. The relationship among the variables is displayed in the
following equation:

𝐸𝐴𝐶𝐵𝐶𝑊𝑃 = (𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐸𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 – 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 ) ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑊𝑃𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝐵𝐶𝑊𝑃𝑇𝑜 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒

(2)

In the AFCAA study, the remaining number of months is derived as a function of
the total number of estimated months and the earned schedule up until the respective
completion point. The total number of estimated months, or program duration, for each
contract is calculated by taking the difference between the most recent estimated
completion date and the contract start date. The current month portion of the BCWP
model is calculated based on the previous period’s earned schedule, plus the earned
schedule for the current period:

𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒 = 𝐸𝑆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣 +

(𝐵𝐶𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝐵𝐶𝑊𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣 )
(𝐵𝐶𝑊𝑆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝐵𝐶𝑊𝑆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣 )

(3)

In addition to this approach of evaluating the remaining number of months, the actual
number of estimated remaining months is also assessed in the BCWP model. For
example, at the 70% completion point for the FAB-T contract, the estimated program
duration is 111 months. At this same point, the earned schedule is calculated at 26
months, while the actual month count is 69 months. Using the earned schedule approach
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would result in an estimated number of remaining months of 85. Using the actual
figures, results in an estimated number of remaining months of 42.
The BCWP model utilizes ordinary least squares regression to calculate the
BCWP burn rate. This burn rate is simply the coefficient from a prediction model
generated from the elapse number of months and the cumulative BCWP figures. At each
of the measured completion points, 20%-70%, the elapsed months are used as the
explanatory variable to predict the response, the cumulative BCWP. For example, if
Contract A reaches the 20% completion point at 13 months, a prediction model is derived
using each of the elapsed months, 1 through 13, as predictors for their respective
cumulative BCWP. The derived coefficient for the elapsed months is used in the BCWP
model as the burn rate. In Figure 5, this burn rate would be approximately $20,629,032.

Figure 5. BCWP Regression Coefficient Example
In addition to this approach of evaluating the burn rate, the monthly average burn rate is
also assessed in the BCWP model. For example, if the cumulative BCWP for the same
Contract A is $266,700,245 at the 20% completion point, then the burn rate would be
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$20,515,404. This is derived from simply dividing the cumulative BCWP by the number
of elapsed months.
As a result of the variations to the original BCWP burn rate formula, Equation 2,
three additional models are tested. Model 1 is the formula as it was utilized in the
previous research study. The BCWP burn rate is calculated using the regression based
approach, and the remaining number of months is calculated based on the estimated
number of total months minus the earned schedule up until that point in time. Model 2 is
similar to Model 1; however, Model 2 uses the actual schedule in place of the earned
schedule to calculate the remaining number of months. Model 3 uses the monthly
average BCWP burn rate in place of the regression based burn rate. Model 4 uses the
monthly average BCWP burn rate and the actual schedule. Table 7 displays the details of
all four models.
Table 7. BCWP Model Variations
Model

BCWP Burn Rate

Remaining Months

Model 1

Regression

Earned Schedule

Model 2

Regression

Actual Schedule

Model 3

Average

Earned Schedule

Model 4

Average

Actual Schedule

After calculating the various predicted EAC figures, the accuracy percentages are
measured based on the numerical proximity to the final EAC. The accuracy of the
calculated figures is measured using an absolute percent error measurement. This
measurement formulates the percentage of error by dividing the difference between the
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final and predicted EAC values by the last reported EAC. This number is then multiplied
by 100 to develop a percentage of error. As an example, a zero percent error rate would
mean that the model predicted the exact final EAC. The following formula further
illustrates this method:

(𝐸𝐴𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 − 𝐸𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 )
% 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 = �
∗ 100�
𝐸𝐴𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙

(4)

Once the error percentages are formulated for each contract, the averages at each
completion point are calculated to determine the overall accuracy of the model.
Accuracy percentages are assessed for predictability of the program level final reported
EAC.
Phase Two
Phase two of the methodology is slightly more open-ended than phase one. The
purpose of this phase is to reveal commonalities amongst contracts that are indicative of
cost growth. In this phase, each contract is analyzed to determine which elements found
at the lower levels are driving EAC cost growth. DCARC’s CPR Viewer and Microsoft
Excel are the primary tools utilized to conduct the assessment of cost drivers. In
addition, the level two and three activities are explored to determine which common
activities and elements exists between the different contracts that may be explanatory in
terms of EAC growth and changes. The commonalities are then further assessed to
determine the extent of the relationship between changes in the EAC and changes in the
WBS activity.
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In hopes of finding additional trends, occurrences of EAC cost growth exceeding
either 5% or 10%, dependent upon the contracts total cost growth, in subsequent
reporting periods is researched to determine which lower level WBS activities may have
driven the increase. Inferences are made by assessing the timing and magnitude of the
excessive cost growth periods. In addition, contracts are assessed to identify the WBS
activities that experienced the largest EAC growth in terms of dollar figure and percent
growth. Following these steps, conclusions are drawn based on trends and patterns seen
in the dataset.
Summary
In summary, this chapter provided the sources of the sample data and the
methodological approaches taken to address the research question. Characteristics of the
sample data, formulas used, and research steps were presented. Finally, this chapter
explained the two phased approach to provide background on the structural framework
for this research effort. Chapter 4 presents the results of the discussed methodological
approaches.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the results of the methodology outlined
in Chapter 3. The results are presented in a consistent manner as the methodology; first,
phase one results are presented and then phase two results are given. Phase one results
detail the findings based on WBS level and using the variations of the BCWP model.
Phase two provides a detailed analysis of each of the nine contracts and then determines
if revealed commonalities amongst programs and contracts are indicative of cost growth.
Phase One Results
The results of phase one examine the differences in outcomes based on using data
from the different WBS levels. The BCWP model distributes traits consistent with
previous research at WBS level one. The model is on average 16% more accurate than
the EAC Composite and 18% more accurate than the reported EAC. These averages are
derived from assessing the model at each completion point from 20% to 70% and taking
the average of the six calculations. At the 60% completion point, the model levels out in
terms of accuracy. In fact, the average error is 1% less accurate at the 70% completion
point than the 60% completion point; this seems counterintuitive to the idea that as a
program matures, you can predict the final costs more accurately. These results are
attributed to the fact that the BCWP model does not have a built in mechanism to account
for the reduced spending seen at the end of the contracts in the dataset. Hence, the model
over estimates for all five contracts at the 70% completion point. Figure 6 displays the
full detail of the level one BCWP model results.
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Figure 6. Level 1 Summary
The BCWP model at level two is on average 17% better than the EAC Composite
and 19% better than the reported EAC. As one would expect, the model improves at each
subsequent completion percentage point. The results are fairly consistent with those seen
at level one and are seen in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Level 2 Summary
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The BCWP model at level three is on average 17% better than the EAC
Composite and 19% better than the reported EAC. The results are fairly consistent with
those seen at levels one and two, and are seen in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Level 3 Summary
Although there is not a large difference between the three WBS levels, level one
is slightly more accurate than levels two and three. A comparison of levels one and two
is seen in Figure 9. There are no practical differences between levels two and three.
Minor differences between these two levels can likely be attributed to accounting errors
within the DCARC EVM data. Level two and three comparison results are shown in
Figure 10.
The results of testing multiple models reveal interesting findings. No one model
performs the best throughout the various levels of contract completion percentage. As a
reminder, Model 1 is the original BCWP model which utilized a regression based burn
rate and earned schedule; Model 2 is the first variation which utilizes actual schedule in
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place of earned schedule; Model 3 utilizes a monthly average burn rate and earned
schedule; and Model 4 utilizes both a monthly average burn rate and an actual schedule.
Model 1 has an average error rate of 29%. This model performs the best in the early
stages of the contract. At the 20% and 30% completion points, Model 1 outperforms all
other models. Model 2 has an average error rate of 31%. It displays similar results to
Model 1 throughout all of the contract percentage completion stages. Model 2 is slightly
less accurate than Model 1, and it does not perform the best at any completion points.
Model 3 has an average error rate of 30%. In the early stages of the contract, it does not
perform well and has an average error rate of nearly 50% at the 20% and 30% completion
points. After these completion points, Model 3 out performs all other models. Model 4
has an average error rate of 33%. It displays similar results to Model 3; however, Model
4 is slightly less accurate than Model 3 throughout the contract percentage completion
stages. It does not perform the best at any completion points.

Figure 9. Level 1 & 2 Comparison
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Figure 10. Level 2 & 3 Comparison
The results of the four models are illustrated in Figure 11. The results suggest
that the regression based burn rate works the best early on in the contract’s completion
stage; hence, why Models 1 and 2 performed better in the beginning. The monthly
average BCWP burn rate works the best after the 40% completion point. The earned
schedule approach seems to outperform the actual schedule method at all stages of
completion. This is seen in the inferior performances of Model 2 and Model 4 in
comparison to Model 1 and Model 3 respectively.
A deeper assessment of the data reveals that the monthly average burn rate
models, Models 3 and 4, are highly influenced by one contract – the Advanced Extremely
High Frequency (AEHF) contract. The AEHF contract has a significant gap between the
contract start date and when EVM reporting began. The contract started in November
2001, but the first reporting period did not occur until October 2002. This delay, results
in the data improperly suggesting that 17% of the total contract is spent in the first month.
33

This would mean that any formulation method that utilizes a burn rate based on monthly
averages, will most likely overestimate due to the appearance of a 17% per month
spending rate. To control for this error, spending was straight-lined over the number of
missing months in the dataset. Following this correction, Models 3 and 4 no longer
display an extremely large error percentage early on in the contract. Model 3
outperforms all models in nearly all stages of completion percentage. These results are
found in Figure 12. The results suggest that a monthly average BCWP burn rate is
superior to the regression based approach. This is seen in the comparison of Models 1
and 3, and the comparison of Models 2 and 4.

Figure 11. Model Comparisons
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Figure 12. Modified Model Comparisons
Phase Two Results
The results of phase two present an in-depth analysis of each of the nine
programs. The WBS lower level composition for each contract was vastly dissimilar.
Due to the vast number of differences found at each subsequent WBS level, a stronger
emphasis is placed on the analysis of WBS level two activities in hopes of findings
similar elements across the contracts. Not only were the naming conventions unique to
each contract, but the number of elements found at each level varied greatly as well.
Figure 13 displays the variation in the number of lower level elements.
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Figure 13. WBS Elements by Contract
AEHF
The AEHF contract is an agreement with Lockheed Martin for the purchase of six
communication satellites. It is composed of four level two activities and seven level
three activities; however, the traditional military standard space WBS level two naming
convention does not occur until WBS level four and carries out through level seven. For
this reason, levels four and five are treated as levels two and three respectively for this
portion of the analysis. The AEHF contract exhibited a total EAC cost growth of 147%
over its duration. This cost growth was incited by several periods of large cost growth.
In an effort to discover what activities may have stimulated this cost growth, any growth
exceeding 10% from one reporting period to the next was further investigated by
assessing which elements of the program experienced representative changes; this
occurred on four occasions. In all occasions, there is no immediate representative effect
found within the lower level cost elements. Instead, the level one summary level
element, Undistributed Budget (UB), is the first to experience an immediate increase.
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Over the subsequent months, the newly allocated budget is distributed amongst the
specific WBS activities.
The first large cost growth increase occurs in October 2004 at the 50%
completion point. The main level two activities that increase in EAC resulting from this
growth are 1.0 Space Vehicle, 3.0 Systems Engineering and Program Management
(SEPM), and 7.0 Operations and Support (O&S). The second large increase occurs in
January 2006 at the 60% completion point. The main level two activity that increases
from this growth is 1.0A Space Vehicle. The third large increase occurs in October 2008
at the 80% completion point. The main level two activities that increase from this growth
are 1.0 Space Vehicle, 1.0A Space Vehicle, and 1.0C Space Vehicle, and 3.0 SEPM. The
last increase exceeding 10% occurs in November 2011 at the 90% completion point. The
main level two activity that increases from this growth is 7.0 O&S. Figure 14 displays
the EAC cost growth of the total AEHF contract and several key WBS level two
activities contributing to this growth. Following the growth of the key activities
displayed in Figure 14, WBS level two activity 1.0A Space Vehicles becomes the
primary driver for EAC cost growth.
The main level two contributors to EAC cost growth for the AEHF contract are
the activities associated with the actual satellite space vehicles. The 1.0 Space Vehicles
activity incurs $1.5B and 94% in EAC cost growth. SEPM also appears to be indicative
of EAC cost growth. This WBS activity incurs $243M and 97% in EAC cost growth.
Results of the greatest contributors to EAC cost growth for WBS level two are found in
Table 8 and Table 9. The “EAC Change” represents the total growth in EAC for the
activity, and the “% Total EAC” represents the percentage of the final EAC that the
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activity accounts for. Table 9 is not all inclusive due to the fact that some activities are
not present in the early stages of the contract. These activities would have a base EAC
amount of zero and result in an undefined cost growth. Attempts aimed at using the first
reported EAC results in impractical results. For example, the first reported EAC for 3.0
Intersegment SEPM is $400, while the final reported EAC is nearly $57M. This results
in an EAC growth of over 14M percent. It is probably unrealistic to assume that
contractors believed this activity would require only $400. Instead, the early estimates
for many of the added activities appear to be placeholders used until additional funding
became available. This was a common theme found amongst many of the nine contracts.
Similar analysis conducted for level three activities can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 14. AEHF EAC Cost Growth
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Table 8. AEHF Level 2 $ EAC Change ($K)

Table 9. AEHF Level 2 % EAC Change

FAB-T
The FAB-T contract is an agreement with Boeing for satellite communications
terminals designed for airborne, ground-fixed, and ground-transportable applications. It
is composed of eight level two activities and twenty level three activities. The FAB-T
contract exhibited an EAC cost growth of 77% over its duration. There were two backto-back reporting periods around the 70% completion point in which the FAB-T contract
experience EAC growth exceeding 10%. The first occurred in February 2010, but no
level two activities saw any representative increases. The only notable increase was to
the level one UB account. The second large increase occurred in March 2010. This
increase resulted in a representative growth in nearly all level two activities. Figure 15
displays the EAC cost growth of the total FAB-T contract and several key WBS level two
activities contributing to this growth.
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Figure 15. FAB-T EAC Cost Growth
The main level two contributors to EAC cost growth for the FAB-T contract are
the Prime Mission Product (PMP) and SEPM. PMP incurred an EAC cost growth of
$500M and 111%; SEPM incurred a cost growth of $126M and 39%. Although the
dollar amount was not as significant, the Test and Evaluation activity experienced a
138% EAC cost growth. Results of the greatest contributors to EAC cost growth for
WBS level two are found in Table 10 and Table 11. Similar analysis conducted for level
three activities can be found in Appendix B.
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Table 10. FAB-T Level 2 $ EAC Change ($K)

Table 11. FAB-T Level 2 % EAC Change

GPS III
The GPS III contract is an agreement with Lockheed Martin for satellite
communications. It is composed of five level two activities and eighteen level three
activities. Three of the level two activities are not populated with data throughout the
contract. The GPS III contract exhibited an EAC cost growth of 52% over its duration.
The contract did not experience any cost growth exceeding 10% from one reporting
period to the next; however there were three instances that cost growth exceeded 5%. In
all instances, the level two 1.2 GPS III activity, which accounts for over 90% of the
contract, experienced representative growth increases. The first instance occurred in
December 2010 around the 50% completion point. The level one UB account and the
level two 1.2 GPS III activity had the largest increases. The second increase occurred in
May 2012 around the 70% completion point. This increase also resulted in representative
increases to the UB account and the 1.2 GPS III activity. The third increase occurred in
December 2013 around the 84% completion point. This increase resulted in a direct
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increase to the 1.2 GPS III activity. Figure 16 displays the EAC cost growth of the total
GPS III contract and both WBS level two activities contributing to this growth.
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Figure 16. GPS III EAC Cost Growth
The main level two contributors to EAC cost growth for the GPS III contract are
the Satellite and SEPM activities. The GPS Satellite activity incurred an EAC cost
growth of $649M and 55%; SEPM grew by $35M and 26%. Results of the GPS III EAC
cost growth for WBS level two activities are found in Table 12 and Table 13. Similar
analysis conducted for level three activities can be found in Appendix B.
Table 12. GPS III Level 2 $ EAC Change ($K)
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Table 13. GPS III Level 2 % EAC Change

MUOS
The MUOS contract is an agreement with Lockheed Martin for five satellites
aimed at significantly improving ground communications. It is composed of eight level
two activities and twenty-one level three activities. Four of the level two activities are
not populated with data throughout the contract. The MUOS contract exhibited an EAC
cost growth of 96% over its duration. There were two periods of large cost growth
exceeding 10% with the MUOS contract. Both occurred after the contract reached the
70% completion point. The first occurred in November 2008. There is an immediate
increase seen in the level one UB account and the level two 1000 Satellite activity. In the
following reporting period, sharp increases are seen in both the 3000 Integrated Ground
and 4000 SEPM level two activities. The second large increase occurs in January 2009.
This increase is primarily driven by an increase to the 3000 Integrated Ground activity.
Figure 17 displays the EAC cost growth of the total MUOS contract and several key
WBS level two activities contributing to this growth.
The main level two contributors to EAC cost growth for the MUOS contract are
the Satellite, Integrated Ground, and SEPM. The SA activity incurs $787M and 122% in
EAC cost growth; the IG activity incurs $551M and 74%; and the SEPM activity incurs
$208M and 75%. The System Support activity experiences over 250% in EAC cost
growth, but the costs are not as significant as other activities. Results of the greatest
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contributors to EAC cost growth for WBS level two are found in Table 14 and Table 15.
Similar analysis conducted for level three activities can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 17. MUOS EAC Cost Growth
Table 14. MUOS Level 2 $ EAC Change ($K)

Table 15. MUOS Level 2 % EAC Change
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WGS
The WGS contract is an agreement with Boeing for a constellation of military
communications satellites. It is composed of one activity at the second WBS level and
nine activities at the third WBS level; however, the traditional military standard space
WBS level two naming convention does not occur until WBS level three and carries out
through level nine. For this reason, levels three and four are treated as levels two and
three respectively in this portion of the analysis. Three of the respective level two
activities are not populated with data throughout the contract. In addition, three other
activities do not experience positive EAC cost growth. The WGS contract exhibited an
EAC cost growth of 207% over its duration. This cost growth was incited by three
occurrences of cost growth exceeding 10%.
In all three instances, the UB account instantly exhibits a representative increase,
followed by the distribution of funding to the 1.1 Satellite Vehicles and 1.2 SEPM WBS
level two activities. The first occurs in January 2007 around the 16% completion point.
The funding behind this increase remains in the UB account for six reporting periods
before it is distributed to the 1.1 Satellite Vehicles and 1.2 SEPM WBS level two
activities. The second occurs in January 2008 around the 34% completion point. This
funding remains in the UB account for two reporting periods before it is distributed to the
same level two accounts. The third large cost increase occurs in December 2008 around
the 49% completion point. This funding results in increases to the same level two
accounts spread over the next three reporting periods. Figure 18 displays the EAC cost
growth of the total WGS contract and several key WBS level two activities contributing
to this growth.
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Figure 18. WGS EAC Cost Growth
The main level two contributors to EAC cost growth for the WGS contract are the
Satellite Vehicle (SAV) and SEPM activities. The SAV activity incurs $569M and 227%
in EAC cost growth; the SEPM activity incurs $101M and 143% in cost growth. The
Command and Control activity incurs 133% EAC cost growth, but the dollar amount is
relatively small. Results of the greatest contributors to EAC cost growth for WBS level
two are found in Table 16 and Table 17. Similar analysis conducted for level three
activities can be found in Appendix B.
Table 16. WGS Level 2 $ EAC Change ($K)
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Table 17. WGS Level 2 % EAC Change

EELV
The EELV contract is an agreement with the United Launch Alliance to improve
U.S. space launch capabilities. It is composed of six level two activities and seventyseven level three activities. At the time of the data collection point cut-off, the EELV
contract exhibited an EAC cost decline of 3% and was 88% complete. In addition, no
level two activities changed by more than 10%, and the level three activities that did
experience significant percentage change were insignificant in dollar amount. As of
January 2015, the EELV contract is at 55% complete, and it has an estimated EAC
growth of over 100%. All populated level two WBS activities experience greater than
73% in EAC cost growth. The SEPM activity is currently estimated to incur over $300M
in EAC growth which is greater than twice the amount of any other activity. Although
the EELV contract is mentioned throughout this research, it is not utilized to draw
conclusions and make recommendations due to its revised completion percentage.
NAVSTAR
The NAVSTAR contract is an agreement with Raytheon Company for nextgeneration global positioning receivers. It is composed of one level two activity and
seven level three activities. Although the naming convention is atypical, the standard
level two activities are represented as level three in this contract; for this reason, levels
three and four are treated as levels two and three respectively. The NAVSTAR contract
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exhibited an EAC cost growth of 107% over its duration. This cost growth was driven by
two distinct periods of growth exceeding 10%. The first instance occurred in December
2011 at the 67% completion point. Both the 15: SEPM and 13: Common Components
level activities experienced immediate EAC growth. The second instance occurred the
following month, January 2012, at the 69% completion point. The funding for this
increase is distributed to the level one UB account prior to getting distributed to the 12:
MUE PMP#2, 13: Common Components, and 15: SEPM level two activities the
following month. Figure 19 displays the EAC cost growth of the total NAVSTAR
contract and several key WBS level two activities contributing to this growth.
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Figure 19. NAVSTAR EAC Cost Growth
The main level two contributors to EAC cost growth for the NAVSTAR contract
are the Common Components, PMP#2, and SEPM activities. The Common Components
activity incurs $16.6M and 115% in EAC cost growth; PMP#2 incurs $15.5M and 98%;
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and SEPM incurs $14M and 138%. Results of the greatest contributors to EAC cost
growth for WBS level two are found in Table 18 and Table 19. Similar analysis
conducted for level three activities can be found in Appendix B.
Table 18. NAVSTAR Level 2 $ EAC Change ($K)

Table 19. NAVSTAR Level 2 % EAC Change

GPS OCX
The GPS OCX contract is an agreement with Northrop Grumman Corporation for
ground control communication systems. It is composed of three level two activities and
twenty-three level three activities. The traditional military standard space WBS level two
naming convention does not occur until WBS level three. For this reason, levels three
and four are treated as levels two and three respectively for this portion of the analysis.
The GPS OCX contract exhibited an EAC cost growth of 33% over its duration. The
contract did not experience any cost growth exceeding 10% from one reporting period to
the next; however there were two instances of cost growth exceeding 5%. In both
occurrences, the level one UB account experiences a representative increase; funds are
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then distributed to the 1.01 OCX SEPM WBS level two activity. The first instance
occurred in February 2009 around the 76% completion point, and the second instance
occurred in September 2009 around the 94% completion point. Figure 20 displays the
EAC cost growth of the total GPS OCX contract and several key WBS level two
activities contributing to this growth.
The main contributor to EAC cost growth for the GPS OCX contract is the SEPM
activity. The SEPM activity incurs $36M and 59% in EAC cost growth. Many of the
activities exhibiting extremely high levels of cost growth are not practically significant in
relation to total contract costs. Results of the greatest contributors to EAC cost growth
for WBS level two are found in Table 20 and Table 21. Similar analysis conducted for
level three activities can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 20. GPS OCX EAC Cost Growth
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Table 20. GPS OCX Level 2 $ EAC Change ($K)

Table 21. GPS OCX Level 2 % EAC Change

WGS 10-C
The WGS 10-C contract is an agreement with Boeing for the seventh satellite of a
constellation of satellites. It is composed of two level two activities and five level three
activities. The WGS 10-C contract exhibited an EAC cost growth of 6% over its
duration. Although this level of cost growth would be acceptable by most standards,
analysis is still conducted on any sharp increases. There was one instance of cost growth
exceeding 5%. This growth occurred in January 2012 around the 75% completion point.
The growth resulted in an increase to the 1.2 Space Vehicle WBS level two activity.
Figure 21 displays the EAC cost growth of the total WGC 10-C contract and both WBS
level two activities contributing to this growth.
The main level two contributors to EAC cost growth for the WGS 10-C contract
are the SEPM and Space Vehicle activities. These are also the only two activities at level
two. The SEPM activity incurs a $5M and 11% EAC cost growth; Space Vehicle incurs
$3.7M and nearly 4%. Results of these contributors to EAC cost growth for WBS level
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two are found in Table 22 and Table 23. Similar analysis conducted for level three
activities can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 21. WGS 10-C EAC Cost Growth
Table 22. WGS C-10 Level 2 $ EAC Change ($K)

Table 23. WGS C-10 Level 2 % EAC Change
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Discussion
The only true commonality amongst cost drivers for the nine space contracts is
the SEPM activity. Based on the findings, it would seem that SEPM is seemingly a
significant factor in determining EAC cost growth. The fault in this logic is that SEPM is
commonly estimated as a factor of either total costs or the PMP (AFCAA, 2007).
Nonetheless, analysis is conducted to determine if there are certain traits involving SEPM
that may dictate EAC cost growth.
Table 24 displays the descriptive statistics of the eight contracts and the SEPM
WBS activity. Data is gathered at each monthly reporting period for every contract, and
the percentage of SEPM is calculated. The findings suggest that there is not a positive
correlation between the average amount of SEPM and the EAC cost growth. It would
almost seem that the fewer amounts spent on SEPM, the higher the EAC cost growth.
The standard deviations of the monthly SEPM percentages are relatively low, and there is
a strong linear dependency between the percent change of SEPM and percent change of
total EAC. These findings would support the thought of SEPM calculated as a
percentage of total costs.
Table 24. SEPM Descriptive Statistics
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In addition to assessing the SEPM activity, attempts are made to group certain
level two WBS activities together by calling them the Prime Mission Product (PMP) of
the contract. By grouping activities in this manner, the goal is to discover any trends that
may exist between the activities’ cost growth and the programs’ overall cost growth. In
most cases, it is either explicitly stated or relatively intuitive in determining what might
be called the PMP. For the purpose of this portion of the analysis, the PMP of the
contract is defined as the WBS level activity that accounts for the largest percentage of
the total contract costs. The one exception to this definition is the GPS OCX contract, in
which the SEPM activity represents the highest percentage of costs. This exception is
made due to the evidence suggesting that SEPM is often computed as a factor of another
cost.
The PMP for each contract is assessed from the 20% to 70% completion points to
determine if trends exists that are representative of EAC cost growth. The findings
suggest that there are no common traits between the mid-acquisition EAC cost growth of
the PMP and the overall cost growth of the contract. This assessment is conducted for
the total contract mid-acquisition EAC cost growth as well. In both assessments, there
does not appear to be any consistent themes. Some contracts experience PMP and total
EAC cost growth early on, while others do not. In either case, the data do not present a
strong argument to suggest that mid-acquisition growth will be indicative of overall EAC
growth. Results of these assessments are found in Appendix C.
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Summary
In summary, this chapter provided the results of the aforementioned methodology
taken to answer the research and investigative questions. Analyses were presented from
both phase one and phase two of the methodology. Many of the implications of these
results were presented and briefly discussed in this chapter; however Chapter 5 presents
the overarching conclusions and closing thoughts for the research.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Introduction
This thesis provides examination of the premise that lower level WBS data can
improve assessments made on contract performance midway through its completion.
Past research suggests that further investigation is needed to assess the distinct features of
specific commodity types at various completion percentages. This thesis explores some
of those distinctions within the space commodity. Analysis is conducted using WBS
level two and three data in hopes of discovering methods that produce more accurate
Estimate at Complete (EAC) figures and finding out which activities act as potential
triggers for EAC cost growth.
Conclusions of Research
In attempting to answer the question of whether or not lower level WBS data can
improve the overall accuracy of EVM based prediction methods, several findings were
discovered. From the first portion of the analysis, we learned that lower level EVM data
did not produce more accurate EAC figures. Our analysis focused on summing up the
activities of the lower levels and using those totals in a BCWP model. As a result, one
conclusion that can be drawn with little debate is that, when predicting program EACs,
the use of lower level WBS data totals in models that are associated with some sort of
burn rate calculation will produce estimates that are not as accurate as the program level
data. This conclusion is driven by the fact that certain summary level accounts do not get
distributed down to lower WBS levels.
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Conclusions about the performance of the BCWP model itself can be drawn as
well. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the model’s accuracy seems to level out at the 60%
completion point. This leveling out is the result of the model’s tendency to overestimate
final costs particularly in the latter stages of the contract. This discovery begs the
question about the validity of the model altogether. In other words, if all the model does
is produce an estimate that is higher than current methods, then it would make sense that
it is generally more accurate. It is well known that DoD contracts are historically behind
schedule and over budget. In the infrequent instances where a contract is not over
budget, the BCWP model may end up being no more accurate than the EAC Composite
or some other widely accepted calculation.
The second portion of the research brought on many interesting findings. First,
the level of variation even within the same commodity was quickly brought to light. The
use of the traditional Military Standard 881C WBS composition was very inconsistent.
In many cases, lower WBS levels had to be treated as levels two and three just to make
comparisons across different contracts. The assumption that the adjusted levels are
accurately portrayed presents additional limitations to the findings of this study. Even
with the adjustments, level two and three activities still vary greatly between contracts
and within programs. This variation led to no common themes or elements being found
that are indicative of EAC cost growth. Each contract seemed to have its own unique
story.
An additional finding was the frequency utilization of the program level
Undistributed Budget (UB) account. Many contracts appeared to use this account as a
buffer for newly acquired funds. The issue this presents when conducting analyses is that
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it becomes difficult to track lower level cost drivers due to the lag in the distribution of
the budget. While funding remains in the UB account, there are positive and negative
adjustments made at lower levels that may or may not be related to the additional funding
received. Analysts would have to guess where the funding was distributed based on the
timing and magnitude of change found in the lower level activities. The Format 5 CPR
provides some explanation for changes; however, the explanations are not always easily
interpreted, provide limited details, and do not often point to a specific WBS activity.
Significance of Research
The findings presented in this research may at first glance appear to challenge the
necessity of having lower level contract data altogether. The reality is that it may still be
too early to draw a consideration that drastic. This research does, however, point out the
fact that standardization of lower level WBS composition is desperately needed. The
current methods of reporting lower level data do not seem to provide any additional
benefits that cannot be gained by assessing contracts at the program level. Until a more
uniform approach is adopted, it may be difficult for program managers and cost analysts
to highlight activities across multiple contracts that are effecting total program costs.
The general statement that states: lower WBS levels should sum up to the level
immediately preceding it, is a common misconception. This train of thought stems from
what is known as the “100% Rule”. Military Standard 881C defines this rule as the
principle that states “the next level of decomposition of a WBS element (child level) must
represent 100% of the work applicable to the next higher level (parent level)” (DoD,
2011). Although an experienced analyst may know the inherent assumption in this rule,
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many others do not. The assumption made is that every parent in the higher level
actually has a child element. As seen in this research with the UB account, this is not
always the case. If a higher level WBS activity does not have any lower level elements,
the sum of the subsequent level will be lower than the higher level if this difference is not
accounted for.
Recommendations for Future Research
This research defined model performance based solely on accuracy to the last
reported EAC, but is accuracy really the only important attribute? A well-defined cost
estimate should be somewhat accurate, but it should also be credible, reliable, and
comprehensive; the same should hold true for a cost estimating model. The idea that the
BCWP model may simply be a calculation method that produces higher cost estimates
was presented earlier in this chapter. Additional research should be conducted to
determine the robustness of the BCWP model. How well does the model do in realms
other than space? How well does the model perform with contracts that are not behind
schedule and over budget? Research should analyze alternative variables in addition to
accuracy to measure model performance.
The assessment of lower level data in a commodity other than space also presents
an opportunity for additional research. Space has a long history of vastly exceeding cost
estimates. Maybe a specific commodity that has been more stable in terms of cost
estimating will have less variation at the lower levels.
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Summary
There is little doubt that the Department of Defense’s data requirement for the
first three WBS levels results in added contractor costs. The findings of this research
question the benefits of this data in the current construct. From a macro-perspective, this
research also highlights the difficulty in attempting to predict EAC cost growth
altogether. As Keller et al. also alluded to, perhaps effort should be redirected from
improving cost estimation models, and instead aimed towards improving the way DoD
management controls program costs (Keller et al., 2014). An array of reasons exists for
program cost growth, each having a unique effect on the program’s activities, yet, there
lies an inherent expectation for cost estimates to holistically capture those changes and
still remain somewhat accurate. In the end, this expectation may not lead to improved
cost estimate accuracy at all; the result could very well be arbitrarily inflated estimates
that are seen as improvements to the status quo based solely on their ability to capture a
portion of the unpredictable cost growth likely to be seen.
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Appendix A: Format 1 Example
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Appendix B: Level 3 EAC Analysis
AEHF Level 3 $ EAC Change ($K)

AEHF Level 3 % EAC Change

FAB-T Level 3 $ EAC Change ($K)

FAB-T Level 3 % EAC Change
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GPS III Level 3 $ EAC Change ($K)

GPS III Level 3 % EAC Change

MUOS Level 3 $ EAC Change ($K)

MUOS Level 3 % EAC Change

WGS Level 3 $ EAC Change ($K)
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WGS Level 3 % EAC Change

NAVSTAR Level 3 $ EAC Change ($K)

NAVSTAR Level 3 % EAC Change

GPS OCX Level 3 $ EAC Change ($K)

GPS OCX Level 3 % EAC Change
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WGS C-10 Level 3 $ EAC Change ($K)

WGS C-10 Level 3 % EAC Change

65

Appendix C: Mid-Acquisition EAC Cost Growth by Completion Percentage

Mid-Acquisition PMP EAC Cost Growth by Completion Percentage

Mid-Acquisition Total EAC Cost Growth by Completion Percentage
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